INTRODUCTION
and developmental psychopathology (Sodian & Frith 1992; Hughes & Russell 1993) suggesting that deception is an ability that develops naturally during childhood, and which is 'normal'. Such behaviours follow a characteristic developmental trajectory (Ford 1995 ; O'Connell 1998) and are impaired among humans with specific neurodevelopmental disorders (e.g. autism; Sodian & Frith 1992) . Hence, there would appear to be an interesting tension between what is supposedly socially undesirable but normal (i.e. telling lies), and that which is said to be commendable but pathological (i.e. total truthfulness). Normal human social interaction may depend upon limited disclosure. Indeed, several authors have pointed out that strictly truthful communication at all times might be rather hard to live with (e.g. Ford 1995; Vrij 2001) and truth itself may be used to malicious ends while some forms of lie can be altruistic (Ford 1995) . Across cultures there are more words for deception and lying than for telling the truth, an apparent discrepancy that may reflect the social sensitivity of indicating that another person is dishonest (Ford 1995 
THE USE OF DECEPTION
[O]ne must know how to colour one's actions and to be a great liar and deceiver. Men are so simple, and so much creatures of circumstance, that the deceiver will always find someone ready to be deceived. (Machiavelli 1999, p. 57) Tactical deception is defined as a behaviour that forms part of the normal repertoire of an animal but which is deployed in such a way that it appears to mislead a conspecific, to the advantage of the index organism (Byrne 2003 Studies of contemporary non-human primates suggest that some form of purposeful deception occurs in those closest to man (in terms of their evolutionary lineage), and that, at the level of species, neocortical volume is related to the frequency of such observed deception (Byrne 2003) . 'Simply knowing the ratio of the brain taken up by the neocortex, divided by the volume of the rest of the brain, enables us to predict 60% of the variance in the amount of deception that is observed in the species concerned' (Byrne 2003, p. 51).
Why might deception arise within primate colonies? Adenzato & Ardito (1999) suggest that deception facilitates individual autonomy within the constraints of group living. To be able to do what he/she wishes, especially in the face of hierarchical restraint, an organism must be able to mislead others. Adenzato and Ardito suggest that deceiving organisms rely upon two cognitive psychological mechanisms: 'theory of mind', by which they mean the ability of the organism to infer what others are thinking, and 'deontic reasoning', by which they mean an appreciation of social rules and the consequences of their transgression. Hence, it only makes sense to speak of 'deception' among primates if the animal concerned gives some indication that it understands how the current situation appears to the conspecific it is deceiving, and if there is some advantage to that deception (e.g. avoidance of punishment or access to reward).
Given the normal appearance of lying and deception during childhood (Ford 1995 ; O'Connell 1998), several authors have speculated upon the (teleonomic) purpose served by such behaviours in human life. These accounts have little to say about the mechanism by which deception emerged during evolution. However, at the level of the individual human child, one speculation has been that deceit delineates a boundary between the 'self' and the 'other', specifically between the child and her mother (Ford et al. 1988 ). Learning at the age of 3 or 4 years that he/she can know something that his/her mother does not know (which itself implies a developing theory of mind) establishes for the child the limit of his/her mother's knowledge, and allows the child some degree of control. Indeed, this experience of control (over information) might drive the 'pathological lying' seen later in life, among dysfunctional adolescents and adults (Ford et al. 1988) . Following this argument, the ability to lie is dependent upon the liar's recognition that his/her thoughts are not known to others; and that different individuals' understandings of the world may diverge. Hence, deliberate deception is dependent upon the acquisition of a capacity for theory of mind, a capacity that has been the subject of functional neuroimaging studies (Fletcher et al. 1995; Gallagher & Frith 2003) .
It is worth noting that lying may be prosocial in certain contexts. It may ease social interaction, by way of compliments and information management. By contrast, precisely truthful communication at all times would be difficult and perhaps rather brutal. Hence, it is unsurprising that 'normal' subjects admit to telling lies on most days (Vrij 2001 
PRINCIPLES OF EXECUTIVE CONTROL

LYING AS A COGNITIVE PROCESS
Deceiving another human subject is likely to involve multiple cognitive processes, including theory of mind concerning the victim's thoughts (their ongoing beliefs) and the analysis of responses made by both the liar and the victim in the context of their interaction. In the light of the above, we may posit that in the normal situation the liar is called upon to do at least two things simultaneously. He must construct a new item of information (the lie) while also withholding a factual item (the truth), assuming that he knows and understands what constitutes the 'correct' information. Within such a theoretical framework it is apparent that the truthful response comprises a form of baseline, or pre-potent response. We would predict that such a response would be made by an honest subject answering the same question or by the liar were he to become distracted or fatigued (indeed, from this perspective it is understandable why inebriation or sedation might 'release' the truth via disinhibition: in vino veritas). We might, therefore, propose that responding with a lie demands some form of additional cognitive processing, that it will engage executive, prefrontal systems (more so than telling the truth). Hence, we have a hypothesis that may be tested using functional neuroimaging (Spence et al. 2001 ).
That the orbitofrontal cortex may be involved in successful deception, or at least in withholding information, has been implied by Ford (1995) . Drawing on the example of the 'pseudopsychopathic personality' syndrome observed after orbitofrontal lesions, Ford points out that though these patients may exhibit certain features of psychopathy (such as impulsiveness and aggression), they tend not to lie. Instead they exhibit a callous disregard for social convention and an 'honesty' that may be extremely insensitive to decorum and the feelings of others. They may be inappropriately truthful (i.e. 'tactless'). Hence, it is possible that the presence of an intact orbitofrontal cortex facilitates the telling of lies (perhaps as a consequence of response inhibition; in this case the inhibition of truthful responses). We used a simple computerized protocol in which subjects answered questions with a 'yes' or a 'no', pressing specified single computer keys. All the questions concerned activities that subjects might have performed on the day that they were studied. We had previously acquired information from each of them, concerning their activities, when they were first interviewed. However, there was an added feature of the method applied in that subjects performed these tests in the presence of an investigator who was a 'stooge', who would be required to judge afterwards whether the subjects' responses were truths or lies. The computer screen presenting questions to the subjects also carried a green or red prompt (the sequence counterbalanced across subjects). Without the stooge knowing the 'colour rule', subjects responded with truthful responses in the presence of one colour and lie responses in the presence of the other. All questions were presented twice, once each under each colour condition, so that finally we were able to compare response times and brain activity during 'truth' and 'lie' responses. We have published studies from three cohorts of subjects 'outside the scanner' Our analyses revealed that whether subjects were studied inside or outside the scanner there was a statistically significant effect of lying upon response time (it being ca. 200 ms longer during 'lying' compared with responding truthfully). In the scanned sample, lie responses were associated with increased activation in bilateral ventrolateral prefrontal and anterior cingulate cortices (together with medial premotor and left inferior parietal cortices; figure 3). These data support the hypothesis that prefrontal systems exhibit greater activation when subjects are called upon to generate experimental 'lies' and they demonstrate (at the level of groups of subjects) that longer processing time is required to answer with a lie. However, our predictions of which prefrontal regions would be most activated during deception were only partly confirmed. The presence of consistent activation in ventrolateral PFCs and the minimal activation of DLPFC suggested to us that that the inhibition of the pre-potent (truthful) response, inherent in our task, contributed most to the pattern of activity seen. While 'lying' comprised only a reversal of the pre-potent response (e.g. 'yes' for 'no') rather than an elaboration of a 'new lie', it may have been insufficiently demanding for there to be marked activation of dorsolateral prefrontal regions (see the Ganis et al. (2003) Other groups have also used fMRI and found the PFC to be implicated in deception. Langleben and colleagues used the guilty knowledge paradigm, to test the hypothesis that subjects would activate executive, inhibitory brain regions while withholding a truthful response. Subjects were studied in a MR scanner while they made motor responses to a sequence of playing cards presented visually. The subjects each held one card, which was known to them and which they believed was unknown to the investigators (its identity comprised their 'guilty knowledge'). Subjects used a button box to respond manually 'yes' or 'no' regarding the identity of the card they held. They also answered control questions, some requiring truthful responses, and other 'non-target' questions to confirm their attention to the pro- real 'feigner' would take account of their response performance as they went along, so that they would not perform 'too badly' all the time (in case this provoked suspicion). To remain credible, such a malingerer would wish to perform no worse than chance when answering questions relating to their feigned deficit (e.g. their autobiographical memory). In a MR scanner subjects performed two forcedchoice tasks, one relating to identifying three-digit numbers they had seen previously, the other to items of autobiographical information, for example, where they had been born (Lee et al. 2002) . Subjects made manual responses to indicate their answers. When compared with truthful responding (on both tasks) malingering was associated with increased activation in bilateral dorsolateral prefrontal, inferior parietal, middle temporal and posterior cingulate cortices, together with bilateral caudate nuclei. The authors did not report any areas where truthful responding elicited greater activation. Response times were not reported.
(d) Ganis (2003)
In this study the authors made a novel distinction, not emphasized in earlier studies, between lies that form part of a well-rehearsed and coherent scenario and those that are spontaneous and need not fit into such a larger narrative framework. Subjects were studied while they gave motor (button press) and vocal responses, comprising both forms of 'lie'. Their findings were that both types of lie were associated with greater activation in bilateral anterior prefrontal cortices and bilateral hippocampal gyri, while there were no reported areas of greater activation during truthful responding. On a sub-group of subjects for whom behavioural response measures were available, the authors did not find a significant difference in response times during lying and truthful responding. However, it is interesting to note that their raw data do suggest a difference of ca. 200 ms (whereas the mean response time for memorizedscenario lies was 838 ms, and that for spontaneous, isolated lies was 859 ms, the mean response time for truthful responses was 613 ms; Ganis et al. 2003 ). This study may have been underpowered to detect significant differences between deceptive and truthful response time. With respect to the proposed distinction between rehearsed and spontaneous lies, Ganis and colleagues report greater right frontal activation in the former and greater anterior cingulate cortex and visual cortex activity in the latter.
(e) Future directions
The scanning studies to date, including our own, have been subject to behavioural and task-related limitations: a certain artificiality, the frequent use of a non-vocal signal to transmit the deception, and the 'low stake' nature of the 'lying' involved. Some of these limitations have involved compromises imposed by the scanning technology itself. Future experimentation should seek to use other paradigms for testing the neurological components of deception, in part by expanding the kinds of tasks used.
In a current, unpublished fMRI study, we have begun to explore this kind of variation, using 'silent periods' in the scanner to allow auditory stimuli and vocal responses to be used. By studying vocal lies and by adding a 'defy/comply' condition, we posited that the following cognitive subtraction would reveal those brain regions specifically activated by lying, rather than by memory of the index event or the mere reversal of a pre-potent response: brain activations specific to lying = (lie-truth) -(defy-comply). This approach appears promising. Preliminary data analysis using this subtraction suggests that lying was specifically associated with activation of the following regions: right ventrolateral and orbitofrontal cortices (BA 47 and 11, respectively), right medial (BA 6) frontal gyrus, right inferior parietal lobule (BA 40) and left premotor cor- 6. COMMENT One of the weaknesses of our first study was that the activations associated with deception enacted through motor responses were confounded by the requirement for response reversal (e.g. answering 'yes' for 'no'). In the later study we attempt to control for this possible confound. Our defy/comply protocol allows us to study response suppression in another context and reveals that even after subtracting away those activations associated with response reversal in 'defiance', lying elicits greater activation in ventral prefrontal regions. The regions implicated by results to date, in our later study, again suggest that a central component of lying is the suppression of truthful (prepotent) responses. Once again, it was the ventral prefrontal regions that were most activated (cf. DLPFC, figure 1).
THE BRAIN AND THE LAW
The first visual record of police interrogation we have comes from a XII Dynasty tomb in Egypt, two thousand years before Christ. The image shows a man being held by three others while the fourth one beats him with a bamboo stick and the fifth, who appears to be the one in charge, supervises the procedure.
( Nevertheless, the right to silence and the value of noncoerced confessions as desirable elements of human behaviour are also deserving of respectful consideration and continue to attract thoughtful review (e.g. Brooks 2000). We do not have the space to do sufficient justice to these issues in the current paper so we offer the following as cautions to the premature application of brain imaging technology to the problem of lie detection. The problems we foresee include the following. 
